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Gender Gaps in Unemployment Rates
in OECD Countries
Ghazala Azmat, Centre for Economic Performance,
London School of Economics
Maia Gu¨ell, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, CREA, Centre for
Economic Performance, CEPR, and IZA
Alan Manning, Centre for Economic Performance,
London School of Economics
In some OECD countries the male and female unemployment rates
are very similar but in others (notably the Mediterranean countries)
the female unemployment rate is much higher than the male. Ex-
plaining these cross-country differences is the subject of this article.
We show that, in countries where there is a large gender gap in
unemployment rates, there is a gender gap in both flows from
employment into unemployment and from unemployment into em-
ployment. We conclude that differences in human capital accumu-
lation between men and women interacted with labor market insti-
tutions is an important part of the explanation.
We would like to thank seminar participants at CEMFI, IFS, IZA, the London
School of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and Princeton University; and
Daniel Hamermersh, Marco Manacorda, and Steve Pischke for their comments.
Gu¨ell gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Fundacion BBVA (proj-
ect FAMRISK). Contact the corresponding author, Alan Manning, at A.Manning@
lse.ac.uk.
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2 Azmat et al.
Table 1
Gender Gaps in Unemployment Rates among OECD Countries
Country
All Working Age (15–64) Prime-Age (25–54)
Male Female Difference Ratio Male Female Difference Ratio
Spain 11 22.91 11.91 2.08 9.2 21 11.8 2.28
Greece 7.56 17.92 10.36 2.37 6.2 15.2 9 2.45
Italy 8.67 15.71 7.04 1.81 6.6 12.7 6.1 1.92
France 9.66 12.96 3.3 1.34 9 12.6 3.6 1.4
Belgium 6.1 9 2.9 1.48
Netherlands 2.74 4.49 1.75 1.64 2.1 3.8 1.7 1.81
Luxembourg 1.77 2.68 .91 1.51 1.4 2.9 1.5 2.07
Germany 8.15 9.22 1.07 1.13 7.2 8.5 1.3 1.18
Denmark 4.69 6.54 1.85 1.39 3.7 4.9 1.2 1.32
Portugal 3.84 5.05 1.21 1.32 3.4 4.6 1.2 1.35
Finland 9.58 10.73 1.15 1.12 7.9 9 1.1 1.14
Switzerland 2.52 3.68 1.16 1.46 2.2 3.2 1 1.45
Japan 4.82 4.46 .36 .93 3.7 4.4 .7 1.19
Sweden 7.5 6.76 .74 .9 5.2 5.9 .7 1.13
United States 4.05 4.33 .28 1.07 3 3.4 .4 1.13
Austria 3.69 3.85 .16 1.04 3.4 3.6 .2 1.06
Australia 7.13 6.64 .49 .93 5.5 5.3 .2 .96
Canada 7.78 7.25 .53 .93 6.5 6.3 .2 .97
New Zealand 6.94 6.58 .36 .95 5.5 5.3 .2 .96
Norway 3.36 3.05 .31 .91 2.6 2.2 .4 .85
Ireland 5.9 5.5 .4 .93 5.7 4.8 .9 .84
United Kingdom 6.75 5.07 1.68 .75 5.4 4.3 1.1 .8
New OECD countries:
Hungary 7.52 6.26 1.26 .83 6.7 5.6 1.1 .84
Turkey 7.49 7.5 .01 1 5.9 5.5 .4 .93
Mexico 1.78 2.58 .8 1.45 1.6 2.1 .5 1.31
Czech Republic 7.27 10.5 3.23 1.44 5.9 9.5 3.6 1.61
Source.—OECD Labour Market Statistics (OECD Statistical Compendium [Paris: OECD, 1999]).
I. Introduction
There is an enormous literature on gender gaps in pay and a vast lit-
erature on gender gaps in labor force participation rates (see Altonji and
Blank [1999] for an overall survey and Blau and Kahn [2003] for a recent
international comparison). Yet there is very little recent literature on gen-
der gaps in unemployment rates. There was a literature on the subject in
the United States in the 1970s and early 1980s (see, e.g., Barrett and
Morgenstern 1974; Niemi 1974; Johnson 1983) but few recent papers—
perhaps because the female and male unemployment rates in the United
States have converged. But this convergence has not happened in all Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) coun-
tries. Table 1 shows that, while the gender gap in unemployment rates
(measured as the female minus the male) is small (or even negative) in
some countries, there are others in which it is very large. For example,
in the United Kingdom, the prime-age female unemployment rate is 1.1
percentage points below the male, while in Spain it is 11.8 percentage
points above. It should be emphasized that the unemployment rates in
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Gender Gaps in OECD Unemployment 3
table 1 are all computed using the standardized International Labour
Organisation (ILO) definition and so are meant to be comparable across
countries.1 One can identify several distinct groups of countries in table
1. First, the highest gender gaps in unemployment rates are to be found
in the Mediterranean countries (Spain, Greece, Italy, and France). Next
come the Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg),
then the Germanic countries (Germany, Austria, and Switzerland), then
the Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland, and Norway), and, finally, the
Anglo-Saxon countries (United States, United Kingdom, Ireland, Aus-
tralia, Canada, and New Zealand). In a number of the Mediterranean
countries the unemployment problem is largely a problem of female un-
employment.2 For future use we will refer to the countries in which the
female unemployment rate is much higher than the male as the “high-
gap” countries and those in which the female-male gap in unemployment
rates is small or even negative as the “low-gap” countries. Figure 1 shows
that the cross-country variation in the gender gap in unemployment rates
has changed over time. Most of the countries that now have large gaps
used to have small or nonexistent gaps and the gap only emerged in the
1960s and 1970s, whereas some countries, such as the United States, used
to have a gender gap but now do not (although it was always much smaller
than seen in some countries today).
The aim of this article is to understand the cross-country variation in
the gender gap in the unemployment rate. One should emphasize that
the question we are interested in answering is not, Why are women less
likely to be in employment than men? (either measured as the employ-
ment-population ratio or the labor force participation rate), for which
there are fairly obvious answers in terms of the allocation of domestic
responsibilities and a large literature on the subject, but the question,
Why, once they have decided they want a job, are women in some coun-
tries much less likely to be in employment than men? Of course, it may
not be so very easy to separate participation from unemployment deci-
sions in practice as there are likely to be feedbacks between the two; for
example, the expectation of higher future unemployment is likely to deter
human capital accumulation and discourage labor supply in the same way
as other anticipated interruptions to market work (see Weiss and Gronau
1981). We do discuss where we think the most important linkages might
be but, to keep the article to a manageable size, we do draw some essen-
tially arbitrary lines around the issues we discuss and those we do not.
1 To be unemployed according to the ILO definition, one must not be currently
in employment, have looked for work in the last 4 weeks, and be available to
start work within 2 weeks.
2 Typically these countries also have very high youth unemployment rates al-
though we do not consider this issue here.
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Fig. 1.—Unemployment rates by gender over time
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Gender Gaps in OECD Unemployment 5
The structure of the article is as follows. In the next section we discuss
human capital, institutions, and discrimination as the likely determinants
of the gender gap in unemployment rates to act as a framework for the
empirical evidence that follows. Section III investigates the variation in
the gender gap in unemployment rates across countries and for different
population groups. Section IV looks at gender differences in labor market
dynamics, the flows into and out of employment, unemployment, and
inactivity. We find that in the high-gap countries there are large gender
differentials in both the flow out of employment into unemployment and
the flow out of unemployment into employment. The rest of the article
then explores these gender differences in flows in more detail. Section V
investigates in more detail flows from employment into unemployment.
The sixth and seventh sections investigate the flow from unemployment
to employment from the supply side and the demand side, respectively.
Our overall conclusion is that human capital theory and institutions
can explain a large part (though probably not all) of the gender gap in
unemployment rates. In addition, there is some evidence that attitudes
toward male and female unemployment may be important in explaining
the gap in countries where unemployment is high.
II. Explanations of the Gender Gap in Unemployment Rates
In this section we review a number of possible theories for why there
might be a gender gap in unemployment rates. There is not much written
on this aspect of the differences between men and women, but a good
starting point is the very large literature on the gender pay gap.
Part of the pay gap between men and women is undoubtedly the result
of differences in labor market attachment that lead to differences in human
capital accumulation. There remains some debate about how much of the
gender pay gap can be explained by differences in human capital, but
there is no longer any debate (as there once was) that this hypothesis has
considerable explanatory power (see Altonji and Blank 1999; or Polachek
2004). It is also true that differences in unemployment rates across de-
mographic groups other than gender are related to differences in human
capital, for example, more education is associated with lower unemploy-
ment (see, e.g., Ashenfelter and Ham 1979). The most plausible reason
for this relationship between unemployment rates and human capital is
that the gap between marginal product when in work and the reservation
wage is smaller for those with low levels of human capital. There are
other reasons why differences in labor market attachment may result in
differences in unemployment rates: for example, Johnson (1983) suggests
that the female unemployment rate is likely to be higher than the male
because women wanting to move from home production into market
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6 Azmat et al.
work are likely to go through a period of intervening unemployment
while men who want to change jobs are likely to remain in employment.
Hence, human capital theory predicts higher unemployment rates for
women than for men and, among women, higher unemployment rates
for women who are likely to have accumulated less human capital, such
as married women and those with children. And, across countries, those
with lower levels of female labor market attachment would be expected
to have higher unemployment rates.3 And over time we would expect to
see rising female labor market participation associated with changes in
the gender gap in unemployment rates.4
The relationship between gender differences in human capital and gen-
der differences in unemployment rates is also likely to be influenced by
labor market institutions. First, institutions that compress the distribution
of wages, such as minimum wage laws and trade unions, may reduce the
incentives to employ workers with lower levels of human capital, leading
to higher unemployment rates for these groups. Blau and Kahn (2003)
find that these institutions have an important impact on the gender pay
gap, so we should not be too surprised if they also have an important
impact on the gender gap in unemployment rates (Bertola, Blau, and Kahn
[2002] find evidence that high gender gaps in unemployment rates and
high youth unemployment rates are associated with wider union cover-
age).
Second, institutions that reduce the turnover of labor (such as firing
costs) or those that make it difficult for groups of workers who are less
firmly attached to the labor force to stay in employment (such as the
widespread use of temporary contracts) are also likely to increase the gap
in unemployment rates between workers with high and low levels of labor
market attachment. For example, firing costs seem to reduce the invol-
untary part of the flow out of employment especially for workers with
long job tenures but also seem to be associated with reductions in the
hiring rate. If women have a higher outflow rate from employment than
men this reduction in hiring will tend to magnify the gender gap in the
unemployment rate.
Finally, part of the gender pay gap may be the result of discrimination
against women. In the presence of equal pay legislation (which all the
3 There is one factor that works in the opposite direction. In countries with a
low level of female labor market participation, it tends to be the higher-skilled
women who are in the labor force. This selection effect will tend to reduce the
measured gender gap in unemployment rates if unemployment rates are negatively
related to skill.
4 Although this relationship may not be monotonic if increasing female labor
market participation initially takes the form of the entry of women into the labor
market with low levels of accumulated experience; see Polachek (2004) for this
argument applied to the gender pay gap.
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OECD countries now have) the only way for employers to exercise any
prejudice may be through differential hiring rates, something that may
be easier when labor markets are slack. Algan and Cahuc (2004) suggest
that a “male breadwinner” mind-set, associated with the Catholic religion,
can explain part of the cross-country variation in gender differences in
employment-population ratios. In what follows we will use this discussion
as a framework for interpreting the results that we find and the hypotheses
we investigate.
III. Variations in the Gender Gap in Unemployment Rates
For the European countries, the main data used in this article come
from the first six waves of the European Community Household Panel
Survey (ECHPS) that cover the period 1994–99;5 for the United States,
we use data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1996 to
2000 (to have an approximately comparable period). Description of the
data can be found in more detail in Azmat, Gu¨ell, and Manning (2004).
We first check that the pattern of gender gaps in unemployment rates
in the ECHPS mirrors that presented in table 1. We first estimate a probit
model for the probability of being unemployed (conditional on being in
the labor force so that we are looking at unemployment rates) including
a dummy variable for being female as the only explanatory variable, that
is, the estimated model is of the form
Pr (Up 1)p F(b  b female). (1)0 1
The first column of table 2 reports the marginal effect of being female
where countries are ordered by the gender gap in unemployment rates
among prime-age workers as reported in table 1 (we also follow this
practice in all subsequent tables). These marginal effects should be com-
parable to the gender gaps in aggregate unemployment rates presented in
table 1. They are similar though not identical because the data come from
different sources and refer to different periods.
The gender gaps in unemployment rates observed in table 1 and the
first column of table 2 could be explained by gender gaps in characteristics
that vary across countries. To investigate this hypothesis we simply mod-
ify (1) to
Pr (Up 1)p F(b  b female b x), (2)0 1 2
where x is a variety of characteristics—age, education, marital status, and
5 For details of the ECHPS, see Peracchi (2002) and Nicoletti and Peracchi
(2002), who discuss, among other things, sample attrition. Because there may be
concerns about the representativeness of the ECHPS we have checked the results
for the United Kingdom and Spain using their respective labor force surveys;
these results are very similar and are available on request from the authors.
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8Table 2
The Marginal Effects of Characteristics on Gender Gaps in Unemployment Rates
Country
A
Female
B
Female
C
Female
F # Age
(15–24)
F # Age
(35–44)
F # Age
(45–54)
F #
Low Edu
F #
High Edu
F #
Married
F #
Div/Sep
F #
Kids
(0–12)
F #
Kids
(13–15)
Spain .087 .086 .052 .078 .06 .017 .004 .012 .075 .075 .035 .013
(.001)** (.001)** (.003)** (.004)** (.003)** (.003)** (.003) (.003)** (.003)** (.004)** (.003)** (.004)**
Greece .112 .102 .067 .054 .03 .004 .002 .002 .03 .011 .026 .038
(.001)** (.001)** (.003)** (.004)** (.002)** (.003) (.003) (.002) (.003)** (.005)* (.003)** (.004)**
Italy .062 .056 .045 .028 .06 .002 .025 .011 .036 .006 .007 .011
(.001)** (.001)** (.002)** (.003)** (.002)** (.002) (.004)** (.002)** (.002)** (.005) (.002)** (.003)**
France .053 .053 .042 .004 .03 .019 .023 .001 .039 .005 .043 .026
(.001)** (.001)** (.002)** (.003) (.002)** (.002)** (.002)** (.002) (.002)** (.003) (.002)** (.004)**
Belgium .084 .079 .058 .017 .03 .001 .066 .003 .058 .086 .043 .024
(.001)** (.001)** (.003)** (.005)** (.002)** (.003) (.002)** (.003) (.004)** (.006)** (.004)** (.004)**
Netherlands .036 .033 .004 .016 .001 .009 .006 .001 .045 .029 .028 .028
(.002)** (.002)** (.005) (.009) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.004) (.009)** (.013)* (.008)** (.010)**
Luxembourg .007 0 .015 .013 .02 .002 .014 .004 .044 .014 .002 .009
(.001)** (.001) (.001)** (.002)** (.003)** (.002) (.003)** (.001)** (.003)** (.003)** (.002) (.002)**
Germany .035 .028 .009 .01 .02 .015 .024 .026 .05 .003 .048 .019
(.001)** (.001)** (.002)** (.003)** (.002)** (.002)** (.002)** (.001)** (.002)** (.003) (.002)** (.003)**
Denmark .046 .045 .043 .023 .02 .023 .022 .032 .011 .011 .059 .046
(.001)** (.001)** (.002)** (.003)** (.003)** (.002)** (.002)** (.003)** (.003)** (.003)** (.004)** (.007)**
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9Portugal .049 .053 .008 .054 .01 .008 0 .022 .043 .013 .041 .01
(.001)** (.001)** (.003)** (.003)** (.002)* (.002)** (.005) (.002)** (.002)** (.003)** (.002)** (.003)**
Finland .019 .032 .007 .009 .01 .003 .002 .007 .044 .024 .021 .003
(.001)** (.001)** (.003)* (.004)* (.003)** (.003) (.003) (.003)* (.004)** (.005)** (.003)** (.004)
United States .002 .002 .002 .004 .01 .001 .007 .001 .012 0
(.000)** (.000)** (.001)** (.001)** (.001)** (.001) (.001)** (.001)* (.001)** (.001)
Austria .01 .005 .006 .016 .01 .011 .002 .005 .008 .023 .024 .031
(.001)** (.001)** (.002)** (.003)** (.003)** (.003)** (.004) (.002)* (.002)** (.004)** (.002)** (.005)**
Ireland .049 .035 .006 .038 .04 .027 .021 .005 .042 .06 .027 .019
(.001)** (.001)** (.003)* (.004)** (.003)** (.003)** (.004)** (.003)* (.002)** (.002)** (.002)** (.003)**
United Kingdom .037 .036 .044 .016 0 .012 .018 0 .004 .004 .003 .002
(.001)** (.001)** (.002)** (.002)** (.002) (.002)** (.002)** (.002) (.002)* (.002) (.001)* (.002)
Sources.—Data for European countries come from ECHPS, data for the United States from CPS.
Note.—The sample is restricted to those ages 15–54 inclusive. Dependent variable is whether individual is unemployed conditional on being in the labor force. The reported
coefficients are the marginal effects. Coefficient in column marked A is that on female dummy in probit model of (1). Coefficient in column marked B is that on female dummy
in probit model of (2) where the controls are age, education (high being college graduates, ISCED 5–7, and low being less than second stage of secondary education, ISCED
0–2), marital status, and number of children ages 0–12 and 13–15. Coefficient in column marked C and subsequent columns is that on female dummy and female dummy
interacted with characteristics in probit model of (3). Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Denotes 5% significance level.
** Denotes 1% significance level.
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10 Azmat et al.
the presence of children in the household. The results are reported in the
second column of table 2. Although there is a very slight tendency for
the gender gap in unemployment rates to fall in the Mediterranean coun-
tries, little of the gender gap can be explained using these characteristics,
and substantial gender gaps in unemployment rates remain in the countries
where they exist in the aggregate data.6
The model estimated so far assumes that all the gender gap in unem-
ployment rates is constant across all segments of the labor force. But, it
may be the case that the gender gap varies with characteristics. So, we
then estimate a model in which all the characteristics are interacted with
a female dummy, that is, a model of the form
Pr (Up 1)p F(b  b female b x b female * x). (3)0 1 2 3
The marginal effects of these interactions are reported in the third through
twelfth column of table 2. Because the probit model is nonlinear one
cannot exactly read off the gender gaps in unemployment rates for dif-
ferent sorts of workers from this part of table 2 but, to a first approxi-
mation, one can work out the gap in unemployment rates between men
and women with a given set of characteristics, x, by adding the coefficients
that apply to them. So, to work out the gender gap for married people
with young children one would add the marginal effects for having young
children and being female, the marginal effect for being married and female
and the marginal effect for being female. There is obviously a lot of
information, but certain broad patterns emerge.
First, the gender gap in unemployment rates is larger for those who
are married and those who have young dependent children. This is con-
sistent with human capital theory as these groups are likely to have larger
gender differences in human capital. These results also mirror the finding
in earnings functions that gender pay gaps are typically larger for the
married and those with young children. However, the variation in the
gender gap in unemployment rates over the life cycle does not seem to
mirror so obviously the gender gap in pay—in the high-gap countries the
gender gap in unemployment rates seems highest among the young while
the other countries seem to show little consistent pattern of variation. It
should also be noted that in most of the high-gap countries there remains
a gender gap in unemployment rates for single childless individuals al-
though there are some countries where the gender gap in unemployment
rates for these groups is very small. A natural next question is whether
6 We do not make any attempt to correct for the selection of women into the
labor force. In countries where female labor force participation is low (like many
of the Mediterranean countries), the higher-skilled women are more likely to be
in the labor force so that the gender gaps in unemployment rates are probably
understated when we do not correct for selection on unobservables.
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the gender gap in unemployment rates that we observe in some countries
is the result of gender differences in flows into unemployment or flows
out of unemployment: this is the subject of the next section.
IV. Gender Gaps in Labor Market Dynamics
Most labor economists are familiar with the following formula for the
steady-state unemployment rate:
heuup , (4)
h  heu ue
where is the rate at which workers leave employment for unemploy-heu
ment and is the rate at which they leave unemployment for employ-hue
ment. But, the formula in (4) assumes that there are only two labor market
states—employment and unemployment. Given the importance of inac-
tivity for women (and increasingly for men in many countries) using this
formula to understand gender differences in unemployment rates might
be thought to be limiting. If one introduces the extra state of inactivity,
then one can show that the steady-state unemployment rate (note—not
the unemployment-population ratio) can be written as
h (h /h )eu ei uiup (1 a)  a , (5)
h  h (h /h ) (h /h )eu ue ei ui ie iu
where
h h  h hie ui iu ei
ap . (6)
h (h  h  h ) h (h  h  h )ie ui eu ue iu ei eu ue
The interpretation of (5) is the following. It says that the overall unem-
ployment rate can be thought of as a weighted average of two “com-
ponent” unemployment rates. The first term on the right-hand side of
(5) is the unemployment rate if there are never any flows into or out of
inactivity (it is simply the formula in [4]). The second term on the right-
hand side of (5) is what the unemployment rate would be if there were
never any direct flows between employment and unemployment, only
indirect flows via inactivity.7 The weight is then a measure of the relativea
importance of flows via inactivity in generating unemployment, although
it is hard to give an intuition for its exact functional form.
If there are gender differences in unemployment rates, this must be
because of gender differences in some (or all) of the hazard rates in (5).
7 Note that, for this unemployment rate, it is the relative size of flows from
employment/unemployment to inactivity and vice versa that is important. So, if
workers flow at a faster rate from employment to inactivity than from unem-
ployment to inactivity, this will tend to raise the unemployment rate.
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Which differences are most important is likely to be helpful in under-
standing gender differences in unemployment rates. Table 3 presents es-
timates of the hazard rates and computation of the different components
in (5) for men and table 4 the corresponding information for women. The
data we use for this come from the retrospective monthly employment
history that all individuals in the ECHPS are asked to complete and from
consecutive monthly CPS files matching those individuals who are in the
sample in consecutive months.8 Our method for estimating the labor mar-
ket transition rates is the following. We have observations on the labor
market state an individual is in one month (denote this by that canS0
take the values e, u, i) and then again a month later (denote this by ).St
As the interval between the two observations is a month, it is a reasonable
approximation to assume that individuals cannot make two transitions in
that period. Then the simplest way to estimate a hazard rate ( say) isheu
to note that
h teuPr (S p eFS p e, S ( i)p e . (7)t 0 t
The left-hand side of (7) is readily computed using our data, and we take
the negative of the log to compute the hazard rate.9 The hazard rates in
table 3 are multiplied by 100 so that they can be interpreted as the per-
centage of individuals in one labor market state moving to another in the
course of a month.
As well as the hazard rates, tables 3 and 4 also report the three com-
ponents of the steady-state unemployment rate as presented in (5)—the
steady-state unemployment rate one would calculate ignoring inactivity
(the eighth column), that one would calculate ignoring direct flows be-
tween employment and unemployment (the ninth column), and the
“share” of the two components using the formula in (5) and (6) (the tenth
column). The penultimate column presents the steady-state unemploy-
ment rate computed using the hazard rates and the final column the actual
unemployment rate in the data as a check on the internal consistency.
8 One noticeable feature of these data is that flows between different labor
market states are much higher in the United States than in the European countries.
While this is probably true, the differences are probably overstated in our data
as the European data come from retrospective information that probably tends
to “forget” transitions, and the U.S. data are known to have misclassification
problems (see Abowd and Zellner 1985; or Abraham and Shimer 2002) that tend
to overstate transitions. However, the main interest here is not the comparison
of the levels of transition rates across countries but the gender differences in
transition rates across countries. As these are likely to be less affected by mea-
surement issues, we do not attempt to correct the data in any way.
9 When the interval between observations is small, the estimated hazard rate
will be very similar to a simple-minded estimate of the probability of moving
states. For example heu as defined in (7) is the probability of moving from em-
ployment to unemployment given that there is not a move to inactivity.
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Table 3
Flows between Labor Market States and Implied Steady-State Unemployment Rates: Men
Country
E r U
(1)
E r I
(2)
U r E
(3)
U r I
(4)
I r U
(5)
I r E
(6)
U-Rate
(No Inactivity)
(7)
U-Rate
(Only Inactivity)
(8)
a
(9)
Implied Steady-State
U-Rate
(10)
Actual
U-Rate
(11)
Spain 1.5 .37 7.43 .85 .72 1.16 16.8 21.3 .07 17.1 17.8
Greece .63 .21 9.4 .61 .44 .99 6.3 13.4 .05 6.6 9.4
Italy .52 .32 3.93 .71 .64 .73 11.7 28.6 .11 13.5 12.6
France .61 .29 8.43 1.85 .86 1.33 6.7 9.2 .12 7 10.1
Belgium .35 .23 5.19 .68 .46 .99 6.3 13.7 .09 6.9 6
Luxembourg .21 .29 10.69 .72 .3 1.82 2 6.1 .06 2.2 2.6
Germany .57 .29 7.42 1.44 .42 1.72 7.1 4.7 .13 6.8 6.1
Denmark .69 .38 10.65 1.72 .81 2.07 6.1 7.9 .11 6.3 8.7
Portugal .43 .23 7.44 .84 .35 1.14 5.5 7.9 .08 5.7 5.2
Finland .92 1.01 9.06 2.63 .97 3.44 9.3 9.8 .19 9.3 11.2
United States 1.26 1.37 51.35 29.22 6.11 10.7 2.4 2.6 .27 2.5 3.4
Austria .61 .37 14.12 1.35 .31 1.52 4.1 5.2 .07 4.2 3.1
Ireland .57 .38 4.57 .54 .76 2.54 11.2 17.5 .09 11.7 12.5
United Kingdom .61 .25 7.7 1.49 .96 1.7 7.4 8.8 .11 7.5 6.7
Sources.—Data for European countries are from retrospective monthly work history data in ECHPS. Retrospective monthly data from Sweden and Netherlands are
missing. U.S. data are from successive monthly CPS.
Note.—Sample restricted to those aged between 25 and 54. Hazard rates are estimated using the methodology described in (7) and refer to monthly percentage transition
rates. U-rate (no inactivity) is the formula of (4). U-rate (only inactivity) is the second part of the formula of (5). is as defined in (6).a
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Table 4
Flows between Labor Market States and Implied Steady-State Unemployment Rates: Women
Country
E r U
(1)
E r I
(2)
U r E
(3)
U r I
(4)
I r U
(5)
I r E
(6)
U-Rate
(No Inactivity)
(7)
U-Rate
(Only Inactivity)
(8)
a
(9)
Implied Steady-State
U-Rate
(10)
Actual
U-Rate
(11)
Spain 1.9 .89 5.62 1.49 .37 .55 25.3 28.7 .14 25.8 31.9
Greece 1.05 .79 5.75 1.1 .25 .55 15.5 24.9 .13 16.7 23
Italy .74 .7 3.62 1.11 .3 .45 17 29.5 .18 19.2 24.2
France .76 .44 6.29 1.99 .49 .79 10.7 12.1 .17 11 16.2
Belgium .56 .65 3.19 .96 .33 .92 14.8 19.3 .19 15.7 9.7
Luxembourg .23 .66 8.61 2.13 .09 .83 2.6 3.3 .18 2.7 5.9
Germany .61 .45 5.03 1.46 .23 .97 10.8 6.8 .18 10 9.6
Denmark .93 .65 7.11 2.54 .83 1.97 11.6 9.7 .2 11.2 9.3
Portugal .62 .43 5.85 1 .21 .66 9.6 12.1 .12 9.8 10.5
Finland 1.14 1.59 8.74 3.45 .91 3.22 11.5 11.6 .24 11.5 12
United States 1.09 2.69 51.09 46.41 3.59 7.25 2.1 2.8 .38 2.4 3
Austria .59 .65 9.23 2.11 .18 .77 6 6.6 .16 6.1 5.4
Ireland .62 1.24 8.63 2.32 .18 1.15 6.7 7.6 .19 6.9 12.4
United Kingdom .39 .85 10.27 4.06 .39 1.64 3.6 4.7 .24 3.9 4
Sources.—Data for European countries are from retrospective monthly work history data in ECHPS. Retrospective monthly data from Sweden and Netherlands are
missing. U.S. data are from successive monthly CPS.
Note.—Sample restricted to those aged between 25 and 54. Hazard rates are estimated using the methodology described in (7) and refer to monthly percentage transition
rates. U-rate (no inactivity) is the formula of (4). U-rate (only inactivity) is the second part of the formula of (5). is as defined in (6).a
This content downloaded from 129.215.28.208 on Wed, 21 Jan 2015 07:46:07 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
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The last two columns are similar, differences arising from the fact that
the labor markets are not in a steady state.10
Looking at the results for men in table 3, one can see that the a is
small, implying that flows into and out of inactivity are relatively un-
important in explaining the male unemployment rate. Also, the two com-
ponent unemployment rates are very similar. This implies that the dif-
ference in the steady-state unemployment rates computed using the
formulae in (4) and (5) are small so that, to a first approximation, one
can ignore inactivity. Given the high labor force participation rates for
men, this is probably not that surprising.
What might be found more surprising are the results for women in
table 4. It is true that a is larger for women than for men, implying a
more important role for inactivity, but, in many countries, it is still very
low. This is quite consistent with a low female participation rate if
inactivity is a very stable state. And, again the two component unem-
ployment rates tend to be quite similar, with the conclusion that the
use of (4) rather than (5) will not lead to seriously misleading conclu-
sions.
Given the results in tables 3 and 4, we will, in the interests of keeping
the article to a manageable length, concentrate on gender gaps in flows
between employment and unemployment and ignore gender differences
in flows involving inactivity. One must be careful here: the results in
tables 3 and 4 do not suggest that gender gaps in flows involving inactivity
are nonexistent, it is simply that they (for some reason) mirror gender
gaps in flows that do not involve inactivity. This needs to be borne in
mind.
The results in tables 3 and 4 can also shed light on whether the hy-
pothesis of Johnson (1983) can explain the cross-country variation in the
gender gap in unemployment rates. Johnson argued that there is a gender
gap in unemployment rates because women wanting to move from in-
activity to employment often go through a period of intervening un-
employment. However, the result that turning off the flows involving
inactivity results in very similar cross-country variation in unemployment
rates suggests that this cannot be the whole story. There are sizable gender
gaps in direct flows between employment and unemployment in the high-
gap countries, and it is not clear that Johnson’s arguments can explain
this.
We now estimate the gender differences in hazard rates controlling for
10 It is worth noting that the gap between the computed steady-state and actual
unemployment rates is noticeably larger for women than for men, especially in
the high-gap countries. This is what one would expect when labor market par-
ticipation of women is increasing markedly, as is the case in many of these
countries.
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Table 5
Gender Gaps in Labor Market Transition Rates: With Controls
Country E r U U r E U r I E r I I r U I r E
Spain .275 .354 .575 .884 .366 .574
(.045)** (.038)** (.066)** (.060)** (.067)** (.061)**
Greece .538 .47 .551 1.312 .002 .608
(.067)** (.058)** (.133)** (.067)** (.103) (.081)**
Italy .394 .138 .359 .849 .263 .641
(.064)** (.057)* (.081)** (.056)** (.066)** (.080)**
France .266 .341 .008 .422 .497 .525
(.061)** (.059)** (.088) (.065)** (.111)** (.085)**
Belgium .466 .49 .424 1.059 .245 .343
(.100)** (.115)** (.187)* (.095)** (.158) (.123)**
Luxembourg .189 .195 .94 .93 .698 .641
(.128) (.111) (.287)** (.086)** (.266)** (.114)**
Germany .012 .425 .05 .395 .519 .34
(.043) (.046)** (.075) (.053)** (.110)** (.059)**
Denmark .371 .432 .387 .609 .064 .026
(.071)** (.068)** (.116)** (.080)** (.114) (.075)
Portugal .446 .3 .16 .69 .257 .56
(.073)** (.068)** (.122) (.069)** (.111)* (.069)**
Finland .344 .068 .28 .629 .341 .179
(.066)** (.060) (.088)** (.061)** (.093)** (.048)**
United States .114 .012 .474 .474 .463 .436
(.013)** (.012) (.014)** (.014)** (.015)** (.011)**
Austria .05 .511 .578 .527 .408 .509
(.093) (.102)** (.168)** (7.12)** (.176)* (.079)**
Ireland .062 .401 1.058 1.174 .687 .22
(.080) (.079)** (.164)** (.077)** (.129)** (.057)**
United Kingdom .473 .292 1.019 1.206 .76 .111
(.054)** (.053)** (.078)** (.051)** (.084)** (.050)*
Sources.—Data for European countries are from retrospective monthly work history data in ECHPS.
Retrospective monthly data from Sweden and Netherlands are missing. U.S. data are from successive
monthly CPS.
Note.—Sample restricted to those aged between 25 and 54. Hazard rates are estimated using the
methodology described in (7) and refer to monthly percentage transition rates. U-rate (no inactivity) is
the formula of (4). U-rate (only inactivity) is the second part of the formula of (5). is as defined ina
(6). Controls are age, education, marital status, and number of children.
* Denotes 5% significance level.
** Denotes 1% significance level.
other relevant variables. As the hazard rates must be nonnegative, a con-
venient empirical model is
b xeuh p e , (8)eu
where x is a vector of characteristics (that will include female dummies).
Substituting (8) into (7) suggests that a simple way to estimate is tobeu
restrict the sample to those who are initially in employment and not
subsequently in inactivity and then use a complementary log-log model
to estimate the probability that the individual is in employment. Table 5
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reports the coefficients on a female dummy when controls for personal
characteristics are included.11
Note that the coefficient estimates will be the extent to which the hazard
rate for a particular labor market transition is proportionately different
for women. So, when we see in the column headed that the coefficientheu
on the female dummy for Germany is 0.067, this means that women are
6.7% more likely to leave employment for unemployment than men.12
There is a lot of information in table 5, but the most important points
are the following. If we consider direct flows between employment and
unemployment, the high-gap countries seem to have larger gender gaps
in both the flows from employment to unemployment and the flows from
unemployment to employment than low-gap countries (read down a col-
umn to see this). Both of these gender gaps need to be understood to get
a good understanding of the source of the gender gap in unemployment
rates.
If we consider flows involving inactivity, women in all countries tend
to have higher flows into inactivity both from employment and unem-
ployment. But, as the discussion of (5) above made clear, it is the pro-
portional difference in the hazard rates from employment and unem-
ployment to inactivity that is important for the unemployment rate, so
that one should look at the difference between the female dummy on the
EI transition and the UI transition in table 5. In the high-gap countries
there is some indication that the gender gap in the flow from employment
to inactivity is larger than the gender gap in the flow from unemployment
to inactivity: this will tend to increase the unemployment rate. There is
a less systematic pattern in the gender gap in flows from inactivity to
employment or unemployment. Given the evidence in table 5, we focus
first on the flows from employment to unemployment and then on the
flows from unemployment to employment.
11 Because we want a common specification for all the hazard rates, the controls
do not include any variables that are state-specific, e.g., characteristics of a job if
one is in employment. But tables 6 and 11 do provide information on the im-
portance of these characteristics. The discussion paper version (Azmat et al. 2004)
also includes estimates without controls—these are very similar.
12 One might wonder whether proportionate or absolute differences in hazard
rates are the more important: we think proportionate differences for the following
reason. To keep things simple, consider the formula for the steady-state unem-
ployment rate in (4). Then simple differentiation shows that
u u
p u(1 u)p ,
 ln (h )  ln (h )eu ue
so that a proportionate change in will have the same impact on unemploymentheu
(though with the opposite sign) as an equal proportionate change in . Thishue
means that we can, more or less, compare the coefficients on the female dummy
for different transition rates.
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V. Gender Differences in Flows from Employment
to Unemployment
As table 5 has shown, women in the high-gap countries leave employ-
ment for unemployment at a higher rate than do men. The flow from
employment to unemployment is investigated further in table 6. These
regressions are similar to the one estimated in table 5 except that, in some
specifications, we include some characteristics of the job as extra controls.
Also, because the information on the characteristics of the job held are
only available for jobs held at the annual interview, these equations are
estimated on annual data.
The first column of table 6 reports estimates of models for the transition
from employment to unemployment that include only a female dummy.
The qualitative patterns of these coefficients that are based on annual data
are the same as those in table 5 (that were based on monthly data) with
women having higher rates of transition from employment to unem-
ployment than men in the high-gap countries. The second column then
introduces personal characteristics as extra controls: this has only marginal
effects on the coefficient on the female dummy. The next four columns
then report results when we interact the female dummy with marital status
and the number of children to see whether there is significant variation
in the gender gap in the flow from employment to unemployment. The
signs of these interaction terms do suggest that married women and
women with children have higher rates of leaving employment for un-
employment (as would be predicted by the human capital model), but
most of the coefficients are insignificantly different from zero and these
coefficients are not noticeably higher in the high-gap countries.13
This suggests that domestic responsibilities do not play a big role in
transitions from employment to unemployment. This is not to say that
domestic responsibilities do not play an important role in women’s flows
out of employment, just that women with children are more likely to
leave employment for inactivity than unemployment. This conclusion is
consistent with information on the reasons given for why jobs end that
is tabulated in table 7 both for those who are currently unemployed and
those who are currently inactive. With the exception of a couple of coun-
tries, reasons connected with “caring” account for a very small fraction
of jobs ending where the individual is currently unemployed.14 This is
13 This result is a little different from that in the literature on education and
unemployment where the high unemployment rate of the less-educated is pri-
marily due to a higher incidence and not a longer duration.
14 In fact, table 7 probably overstates the proportion, as women who had chil-
dren and left employment for inactivity but are now trying to get a job again
will be included in the currently unemployed category.
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not surprising: most women leaving employment to have children go
directly into inactivity.
In many countries men are more likely than women to be laid-off. In
countries such as the United Kingdom this difference is extreme—45%
of male jobs end because the worker is laid-off compared to 23% of
women. In the high-gap countries, the most striking feature of table 7 is
that there is not a large gender difference in the fraction of jobs ending
in layoff. A plausible explanation of this is that men in the high-gap
countries are much more likely to be in long-term permanent jobs in
which the right of employers to fire workers is severely restricted. Women
are less likely to be in these jobs because they are more likely to have
had interruptions in their work histories.
This hypothesis is explored further in the final column in table 6, where
we report the coefficient on the female dummy when job characteristics
(industry, occupation, public/private size of firm, full-/part-time, per-
manent/temporary, job tenure) are also included in a model of the tran-
sitions from employment to unemployment. Petrongolo (2004) has doc-
umented how female workers are overrepresented in temporary and
part-time jobs that are generally at more risk of ending. In some of the
high-gap countries, notably France and Spain (which are heavy users of
temporary contracts; see Azmat et al. [2004, table A1]), the introduction
of these variables does significantly reduce the coefficient on the female
dummy, suggesting that the “two-tier” labor market operated in these
countries that protects the jobs of some workers at the expense of others
works to the disadvantage of women. Now, let us turn to flows in the
opposite direction, from unemployment to employment.
VI. Flows from Unemployment to Employment:
The Behavior of Workers
The actions of both individuals and employers are likely to affect the
flow from unemployment to employment. In this section, we consider
the actions of the unemployed themselves; the following section considers
the actions of employers.
The unemployment rate is meant to measure the fraction of people who
want a job but do not have one. The ILO definition of unemployment
uses evidence that people have looked for work in the recent past and
are available to start work in the near future to determine whether people
without work currently want it. But some economists think that, while
there is a meaningful distinction between employment and nonemploy-
ment, the distinction between unemployment and inactivity is meaning-
less. On this view, the fact that fewer women want paid work (largely
because of domestic responsibilities) spills over into a higher unemploy-
ment rate and does not show up only in a lower labor force participation
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Table 6
Gender Differences in Flows from Employment to Unemployment
Country
No Controls,
Coefficient on
Female Dummy
Controls on Personal
Characteristics,
Coefficient on
Female Dummy
Controls on Personal Characteristics and Interactions
Controls on Personal
and Job Characteristics,
Coefficient on
Female Dummy
Coefficient
on Female
Dummy
Coefficient
on Female
# Married
Coefficient
on Female
# Kids0–12
Coefficient
on Female
# Kids13–15
Spain .222 .239 .199 .01 .071 .167 .141
(.052)** (.054)** (.080)* (.116) (.141) (.194) (.060)*
Greece .531 .549 .516 .01 .061 .364 .554
(.074)** (.076)** (.114)** (.169) (.214) (.285) (.084)**
Italy .056 .136 .1 .134 .254 .205 .018
(.070) (.071) (.098) (.160) (.195) (.277) (.077)
France .357 .432 .158 .394 .358 .393 .279
(.096)** (.097)** (.152) (.207) (.232) (.422) (.118)*
Belgium .717 .803 .449 .348 .677 .039 .729
(.132)** (.134)** (.207)* (.284) (.391) (.657) (.162)**
Netherlands .597 1.007 .168 .527 .172 .592 1.152
(.133)** (.118)** (.202) (.305) (.353) (.443) (.150)**
Luxembourg .334 .28 .43 1.511 .069 .014 .149
(.296) (.302) (.515) (.688)* (.796) (1.491) (.394)
Germany .153 .083 .374 .486 .289 .468 .108
(.053)** (.054) (.090)** (.115)** (.135)* (.213)* (.065)
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Denmark .612 .636 .238 .206 .586 13.362 .502
(.118)** (.120)** (.173) (.249) (.323) (363.531) (.140)**
Portugal .448 .543 .243 .006 .681 .427 .49
(.078)** (.080)** (.136) (.169) (.191)** (.275) (.086)**
Finland .358 .435 .204 .405 .011 .071 .451
(.124)** (.127)** (.214) (.271) (.290) (.421) (.153)**
Sweden .014 .205 .117 .095 .36 .02 .367
(.093) (.125) (.169) (.196) (.211) (.280) (.151)*
Austria .29 .011 .271 .691 .712 .211 .202
(.122)* (.111) (.197) (.260)** (.279)* (.498) (.131)
Ireland .103 .223 .12 .232 .048 .521 .234
(.108) (.089)* (.175) (.235) (.271) (.413) (.103)*
United Kingdom .188 .028 .211 .129 .091 .314 .032
(.089)* (.094) (.131) (.187) (.245) (.341) (.104)
Source.—Data are from ECHPS.
Note.—The sample is all those who are employed at one interview and employed or unemployed subsequently. Model estimated is a clog-log model where the dependent
variable takes the value one if the individual is still employed. Standard errors are in parentheses. The ILO main activity status is used for Sweden as the self-defined main
activity status question, used for the other countries, is not asked. Controls are age, education, marital status, and number of children.
* Denotes 5% significance level.
** Denotes 1% significance level.
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Table 7
Reasons for Leaving Previous Job (%)
Country Sex
Currently Unemployed Currently Inactive
Obliged by
Employer
End of
Contract
Childbirth/
Child Care
Sick/Disabled/
Retired/Other
Obliged by
Employer
End of
Contract
Childbirth/
Child Care
Sick/Disabled/
Retired/Other
Spain M 22 63 0 15 20 20 0 60
F 17 64 5 14 12 30 16 41
Greece M 38 37 0 26 10 5 0 85
F 38 39 5 18 16 13 22 49
Italy M 39 36 1 23 16 6 0 78
F 28 46 4 22 13 12 21 53
France M 41 44 0 15 33 5 1 60
F 34 44 6 17 17 11 21 51
Belgium M 55 18 0 27 37 2 0 61
F 43 22 8 26 21 8 16 55
Netherlands M 30 15 2 53 8 4 1 86
F 12 12 42 35 7 8 38 47
Germany M 59 20 0 21 46 10 0 45
F 54 22 1 23 27 8 19 47
Denmark M 42 26 1 31 10 11 0 79
F 36 29 7 29 12 14 5 70
Portugal M 24 40 0 37 4 5 0 91
F 24 44 4 29 6 12 11 71
Finland M 28 57 0 14 10 31 0 58
F 22 60 4 14 9 34 9 48
Austria M 43 10 1 47 12 2 0 86
F 33 15 18 34 9 3 36 53
Ireland M 41 33 1 25 18 7 1 73
F 26 33 3 38 11 10 36 43
United Kingdom M 45 18 1 37 22 6 4 68
F 23 16 16 45 12 6 36 46
Source.—Data are from ECHPS.
Note.—Question asked only of those who have worked within the last 2 years. Other reasons include marriage, move for partner’s job, closure of own business, and
study/national service.
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Table 8
Are the Unemployed More Likely than the Inactive to Get a Job?
Female
Female & Unemployed
in tp 0 Unemployed in tp 0
Spain .124 .418 1.702
(.164) (.069)** (.047)**
Greece .302 .426 1.985
(.253) (.105)** (.074)**
Italy 1.04 .611 1.452
(.324)** (.100)** (.070)**
France .269 .19 1.557
(.196) (.100) (.077)**
Belgium .836 .513 1.396
(.347)* (.169)** (.131)**
Luxembourg .203 .317 .793
(.325) (.159)* (.112)**
Germany .093 .094 1.392
(.157) (.070) (.051)**
Denmark .428 .434 1.78
(.219) (.104)** (.081)**
Portugal .346 .289 1.724
(.227) (.097)** (.070)**
Finland .059 .137 .911
(.196) (.078) (.059)**
United States .035 .266 1.145
(.026) (.016)** (.012)**
Austria .45 .171 2.149
(.303) (.129) (.092)**
Ireland .341 .491 .972
(.265) (.104)** (.067)**
United Kingdom .179 .235 1.579
(.138) (.073)** (.055)**
Sources.—Data for European countries are from ECHPS retrospective work history data; data for
United States are from successive monthly CPS files.
Note.—The sample is all those who are not in employment in an initial month, and the dependent
variable is whether they are still not in employment a month later. The other controls included are age,
education level, gender, presence and age of children, and the gender dummy interacted with the other
controls.
* Denotes 5% significance level.
** Denotes 1% significance level.
rate. If this is true, then, in some sense, the female unemployed in high-
gap countries may be less serious about wanting a job and taking steps
to get one than the male unemployed. There are a number of ways in
which one might test this hypothesis.
Whether unemployment and inactivity are distinct labor market states
was a question first posed by Flinn and Heckman (1983) and subsequently
also addressed by Jones and Riddell (1999). The basis of their tests is to
see whether there is a significant difference between the probability of
entering employment between those who are unemployed and those who
are inactive.
Table 8 reports results for this exercise for the countries in the ECHPS.
The sample is those who are either unemployed or inactive in the initial
observation, and the dependent variable is binary according to whether
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the individual is subsequently in employment or not. We report the mar-
ginal effect of being in employment in a month’s time of being unem-
ployed rather than inactive. We also interact a female dummy with this
variable to see whether there are significant gender differences. In all
countries the unemployed are more likely to get a job than the inactive.
The extent of this is similar in high-gap and low-gap countries. Further,
the interaction of the initially unemployed variable with the female
dummy is not noticeably smaller in the high-gap countries, as one would
expect if the female unemployed are less serious about getting work than
their male counterparts: indeed the interaction term is largest in some of
the high-gap countries. There is no evidence here that, in the high-gap
countries, the difference between the unemployed and the inactive is more
blurred for women than in the low-gap countries.
Another way to consider the hypothesis that the female unemployed
in some countries are less serious about getting work is to look at evidence
on job search intensity. Measuring search intensity is problematic, and
the only available evidence is on numbers and types of job search methods
that the unemployed report using (though it should be noted that those
who report using more search methods do typically have lower durations
of unemployment). Table 9 presents evidence for the three countries for
which we have been able to obtain it—Spain, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. There are sizable and well-known differences in the
use of different search methods across countries, with, for example, the
unemployed in the United States being much less likely to report use of
the public employment service and to report the use of personal contacts
and the United Kingdom unemployed reporting the use of more search
methods than those in the United States and Spain (see Pellizzari [2004]
for a cross-country comparison of search methods used to get jobs and
the wage premia associated with them).15 In all countries men report using
slightly more search methods than women, but this gap is similar in Spain
(a high-gap country) and the United States/United Kingdom (both low-
gap countries). The limited evidence presented provides no support for
the view that the women in high-gap countries are much less serious in
their desire for work, as evidenced by their search effort.
Another variant of this hypothesis is that the level and availability of
welfare benefits affect the reservation wage and, hence, the exit rate from
unemployment. Table 10 presents some data on the fraction of the un-
employed of different genders who report receiving any form of welfare
benefit associated with unemployment. In most countries women are less
likely to receive welfare benefits than men, primarily because their weaker
15 One should not make too much of this as the different countries allow re-
spondents a different maximum number of search methods to be listed, and this
may influence responses, although very few report the maximum allowed.
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Table 9
Methods of Job Search among the Unemployed (%)
U.S. (CPS) Method Mentioned UK (LFS) Method Mentioned Spain (LFS) Method Mentioned
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Contacted public employment service
or other public body 22.2 19.9 83.9 63.0 88.6 86.0
Applied directly to employers 66.2 62.8 57.4 49.1 25.4 20.0
Placed or answered advertisements 16.5 16.4 65.0 60.6 14.2 16.7
Sent out resumes/applications 39.0 44.4 47.1 45.2 5.7 7.1
Looked at advertisements 20.9 21.6 90.9 91.7 14.8 17.4
Contacted friends/relatives/unions 19.8 13.9 70.1 60.4 51.2 48.0
Private employment agency 6.5 6.5 24.1 18.4 3.2 4.0
Other 8.6 9.0 9.3 7.5 5.1 7.1
Average number of search methods 2.00 1.94 4.70 4.08 1.98 1.96
Number of observations 92,001 92,001 117,941 70,152 284,684 328,296
Sources.—Data from the CPS are from the period January 1997 to December 1998; data from the United Kingdom and Spanish LFS are for March 1992 to February 2003.
Note.—The classification of search methods is different in the three countries, and some reclassification has been done. For Spain, data on the method “looked at advertisements”
are available only after 1999. For Spain, until 1998, the maximum number of methods respondents could answer was three. From January 1999 to March 2002, the fraction of
unemployed answering “4 or more methods” was 15.9% for males and 15.7% for females.
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Table 10
Benefit Receipt among the Unemployed
Country Male Female
Spain 34.56 15.86
Greece 13.62 9.41
Italy 4.29 3.28
France 51.01 40.55
Belgium 79.85 73.99
Luxembourg 22.22 17.86
Germany 68.7 69.44
Denmark 85.8 83.72
Portugal 26.92 23.37
Finland 79.66 75.43
Austria 59.45 43.5
Ireland 87.86 44.9
United Kingdom 33.25 17.21
Source.—ECHPS.
Note.—The question asked is, “Do you receive un-
employment benefit or assistance?”
employment history makes them less likely to have established entitlement
to unemployment benefits and because unemployed women may be living
with employed men and so not be eligible for means-tested unemployment
assistance. Looking at this table, it is very hard to see how it could possibly
form the basis of an explanation as to why, in some countries, there is
such a large gender gap in unemployment rates. For example, virtually
no one, male or female, in Italy receives any benefits, and the proportions
of men and women doing so in Spain and the United Kingdom are very
similar even though they have very different gender gaps in unemploy-
ment rates.
However, while we might expect reservation wages to be influenced
by welfare benefits, there are other factors that might be important in
determining the minimum level of wages acceptable to the unemployed.
The ECHPS directly asks the unemployed about the minimum acceptable
wage at which they would work. The female unemployed unsurprisingly
report lower reservation wages than the male unemployed,16 and a more
pertinent question is whether the gap between reservation wages and the
average level of wages is higher for women than for men. We used the
ECHPS to compute gender gaps in both wages and reservation wages
corrected for personal characteristics.17 We then computed a gender gap
16 This gender difference in reservation wages probably reflects the gender pay
gap but may also reflect the fact that they may attach greater importance to
nonwage attributes of jobs.
17 Note that to maintain comparability with our measure of the gender gap in
unemployment rates as the female minus the male we measure all gender gaps in
this way even though the gender gap in wages is normally measured the other
way round.
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Fig. 2.—The gender gap in unemployment rates and reservation wage/wage ratios
in the log of the reservation wage minus the log of the wage (we will call
this, with some abuse of terminology, the gender gap in the replacement
ratio) and, in figure 2, plot this against the gender gap in unemployment
rates. The gender gap in the replacement ratio is generally positive, in-
dicating a smaller gender gap in reservation wages than in actual wages.
But there is no indication that the countries with a large gender gap in
replacement ratios have a large gender gap in unemployment rates: in-
deed the regression line (shown on fig. 2) is negatively sloped albeit with
a t-statistic of only 1.1.
This section has explored the hypothesis that, for some reason, women
in some countries who are classified as unemployed are not as serious
about wanting work as the male unemployed or are more selective about
the jobs they will take. But we have found little evidence for this hy-
pothesis.
Another possible hypothesis about why women in the high-gap coun-
tries take longer to find a job than men is from the demand side. The
next section considers this.
VII. Flows from Unemployment to Employment:
The Behavior of Employers
There are a number of possible reasons why the demand for women may
be lower than for men and why such a difference in demand might get
reflected in differential unemployment durations and not just wages. The
human capital hypothesis predicts that workers with low levels of human
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capital will find it harder to get a job because it is harder to find jobs
paying above the reservation wage. If this is the case, we would expect
to see larger gender gaps in the flows from unemployment to employment
for groups where the gender gap in accumulated human capital is likely
to be larger, such as those who are married and those with young de-
pendent children. Table 11 presents estimates from annual data on the
transition rates from unemployment to employment. The first four col-
umns estimate interactions of the female dummy with marital status and
dependent children. As predicted by the human capital hypothesis, there
is a larger gender gap in flows from unemployment to employment for
the married and those with dependent children. There is also, however,
a sizable estimated gender gap in this transition rate in the high-gap coun-
tries among the single and childless.
This evidence on the importance of human capital is rather indirect, so
the second part of table 11 investigates whether more direct measures also
help to explain the gender gap. The ECHPS contains limited information
on work history, but we do include a dummy variable for whether the
individual has ever worked before and a measure of how long it is since
the individual last worked. These variables are themselves significant in
explaining the transition rate, but they make relatively little difference to
the coefficients on the other gender variables, as can be seen by comparing
the coefficients in the two panels of table 11.18
As emphasized in the theoretical section, it may be that it is the inter-
action of human capital differences with labor market institutions that is
important in explaining the high gender gap in unemployment rates in
some countries. Blau and Kahn (2003) have suggested that cross-country
differences in the gender pay gap can be explained by gender-unspecific
labor market institutions such as the minimum wage and collective bar-
gaining. Figure 3 shows that there is a weak positive relationship be-
tween the gender pay gap and the gender gap in unemployment rates
(the t-statistic is 1.2), suggesting that pay compression may lead to di-
vergence in unemployment outcomes.19 But this evidence is hardly over-
whelming, and the decision to employ a man rather than a woman may
not be based on a comparison of wages alone.
One source of a difference in the employment costs of men and women
comes from maternity leave, some of whose costs are typically borne by
employers. But, as table 12 shows, the differences in maternity leave
regulations across EU countries are relatively small, and the Nordic coun-
tries, which have generous maternity provisions, also have small gender
18 This is true whether the work history variables are included on their own
(as is the case with the estimates presented in table 11) or interacted with gender.
19 These gender gaps come from a regression in which personal characteristics
are also included.
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gaps in unemployment rates. Ruhm (1998) found that maternity leave
was positively associated with female employment to population ratios
(he did not consider unemployment rates).
Another hypothesis is that differing attitudes toward male and female
employment may affect the gender gap in unemployment rates (see
Algan and Cahuc [2004], for a similar idea that these attitudes are as-
sociated with Catholicism). Any such link may come from the supply
side, with women in some countries being less concerned about getting
jobs, or from the demand side, with employers thinking that women
are less deserving of employment than men and making their hiring
decisions accordingly. We can get some idea how widespread discrim-
inatory attitudes are from the 1996 Eurobarometer survey that asks
respondents whether they agree with the statement “When jobs are
scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.” In all coun-
tries men are more likely than women to think that women are less
deserving of employment. But there are also substantial differences
across countries with, crudely, the Nordic countries being less discrim-
inatory and the Mediterranean countries more so. There are also dif-
ferences across regions within countries, for example, southern Italy is
more discriminatory than northern Italy. Figure 4 plots the proportion
against the gender differential in the unemployment rate at the regional
level, marking the observations with a two-letter code for the country
to which they refer. There is a clear positive relationship between the
two variables that the first column of table 13 shows is significantly
different from zero. One might think that all of this is driven by dif-
ferences across countries but, while the inclusion of country fixed effects
reduces the size of the “attitudinal” variable, it remains significantly
different from zero.
However, a problem with this hypothesis is that the discriminatory
attitudes have been around for a long time (as can be confirmed by ex-
amination of the 1973 and 1986 Eurobarometer surveys that contain sim-
ilar questions) but, as figure 1 shows, large gender gaps in unemployment
rates are a relatively recent phenomenon. One way to reconcile this is
the following idea. When overall unemployment rates are high and there
are many applicants for most jobs, employers may be faced with a large
number of job applicants who are more or less equivalent. In this situation
they are more or less free to indulge any slight discriminatory preferences
they may have without suffering any loss in profits from doing so
(Becker’s [1957] model of discrimination would predict this). In contrast,
in tight labor markets, waiting for a male job applicant rather than hiring
a female one may be a much more costly strategy. Hence, putting prej-
udices into practice is easier when unemployment is high and there are
long queues for jobs, as has been the situation in most of the high-gap
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Table 11
Gender Differences in Flows from Unemployment to Employment
Country
Controls on Personal Characteristics and Interactions
Controls on Personal Characteristics, Work History,
and Interactions
Coefficient
on Female
Dummy
Coefficient
on Female
# Married
Coefficient
on Female
# Kids0–12
Coefficient
on Female
# Kids13–15
Coefficient
on Female
Dummy
Coefficient
on Female
# Married
Coefficient
on Female
# Kids0–12
Coefficient
on Female
# Kids13–15
Spain .24 .066 .195 .048 .206 .139 .148 .062
(.064)** (.101) (.115) (.162) (.064)** (.101) (.116) (.163)
Greece .412 .123 .455 .239 .401 .117 .445 .243
(.089)** (.150) (.192)* (.230) (.089)** (.150) (.193)* (.230)
Italy .34 .059 .17 .13 .328 .06 .234 .081
(.072)** (.147) (.174) (.216) (.073)** (.148) (.175) (.216)
France .213 .015 .438 .057 .211 .051 .323 .072
(.130) (.199) (.222)* (.399) (.130) (.199) (.222) (.400)
Belgium .349 .367 .076 .022 .396 .325 .125 .175
(.190) (.289) (.343) (.627) (.191)* (.289) (.344) (.632)
Netherlands .284 .164 .819 .742 .31 .158 .708 .668
(.165) (.223) (.251)** (.400) (.164) (.223) (.253)** (.404)
Germany .051 .111 .238 .128 .053 .111 .241 .125
(.098) (.125) (.148) (.237) (.098) (.125) (.148) (.237)
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Denmark .521 .245 .336 .437 .506 .245 .381 .385
(.173)** (.246) (.305) (.629) (.174)** (.247) (.306) (.630)
Portugal .241 .043 .123 .191 .227 .025 .107 .19
(.110)* (.148) (.170) (.248) (.111)* (.149) (.170) (.248)
Finland .04 .159 .058 .192 .047 .105 .064 .063
(.194) (.256) (.267) (.446) (.196) (.258) (.269) (.448)
Sweden .21 .098 .194 .244 .21 .098 .194 .244
(.138) (.269) (.267) (.399) (.138) (.269) (.267) (.399)
Austria .638 .108 .836 1.164 .655 .223 .627 .888
(.214)** (.311) (.317)** (.575)* (.218)** (.312) (.320) (.587)
Ireland .103 .811 .311 .218 .121 .433 .353 .312
(.131) (.255)** (.222) (.362) (.132) (.258) (.224) (.369)
United Kingdom .244 .473 .473 .076 .179 .437 .416 .074
(.119)* (.193)* (.238)* (.363) (.121) (.195)* (.239) (.366)
Source.—Data are from ECHPS.
Note.—The sample is all those who are unemployed at one interview and employed or unemployed subsequently. Model estimated is a log-log model where the dependent
variable takes the value one if the individual is still unemployed. Standard errors are in parentheses. The ILO main activity status is used for Sweden as the self-defined main
activity status question, used for the other countries, is not asked.
* Denotes 5% significance level.
** Denotes 1% significance level.
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Fig. 3.—The gender gap in unemployment rates and in wages
countries in the 1980s and 1990s.20 We investigate this hypothesis in the
third column of table 13, including the interaction of the male unem-
ployment rate with the attitudinal variable (as well as the level of the male
unemployment rate). The interaction term is positive and significantly
different from zero.
Finally, another possibility is that there is simply a mismatch between
the types of jobs wanted by the female unemployed and the jobs that
employers are offering. Perhaps the most plausible form of mismatch is
that women may want part-time jobs but these are very rare in some
countries.
Table 14 investigates this hypothesis by presenting a comparison of the
fraction of the unemployed who say they want part-time work and the
share of employment that is part-time. There is no evidence that there is
a large disparity between the type of jobs that women want and the type
of jobs that are available. For example, in Spain the desire for part-time
employment among the unemployed is lower than the incidence of part-
time working in the employed population (see also Petrongolo [2004] for
evidence that, in high-gap countries a higher proportion of women work-
ing part-time report that they would prefer a full-time job which is also
consistent with this). It seems more likely that, if there is a deficit of part-
20 This does not mean that the exercise of such prejudice is costless: to the extent
that certain groups are protected from competition for jobs from other groups,
the result is likely to be higher wage pressure and a higher natural rate of un-
employment. This conclusion is usually derived in the context of prejudice against
the long-term unemployed (see, e.g., the “ranking” model of Blanchard and Dia-
mond [1994]), but the same principles apply to other sorts of prejudice.
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Table 12
Maternity Leave Legislation, 1999–2000
Country
Maternity Leave Parental Leave
Length
(Weeks)
Payment
(% Earnings)
Continuation
of Payment
by Employer
Length
(Months)
Maximum
Child Age
(Years) Payment
Austria 16 100 Low wage workers 3–24 2 i410/month
Netherlands 16 100 No 6 8 Unpaid
Spain 16 100 No . . . 3 Unpaid
Luxembourg 16 . . . No 6 5 i1,487/month
Germany 14 100 No . . . 3 i306/month
Greece 14 100 No 3.5 3.5 Unpaid
Italy 18 80 No 10 3 30% earnings
France 16–26 84 Yes . . . 3 i461/month
United Kingdom 14 90 No 3.25 5 Unpaid
Portugal 12.5 100 No 6 3 Unpaid
Denmark 18 67 Yes 2–12 8 i920/month
Finland 17.5 66 Yes 6.5 3 i10/day
Belgium 15 82 first month, 75 rest No 3 4 i505/month
Ireland 14 70 No 3.5 5 Unpaid
Sweden 12 80 . . . 18 8 80% earnings
United States 12 Unpaid No . . . . . . . . .
Source.—Cohen (1999).
Note.—The Council Directive 92/85/EEC of October 19, 1992, sets a minimum period of 14 weeks (including the 2 weeks before and after birth) of maternity leave. The
amount of maternity pay is fixed by the national legislation of the country and should be at least equal to the value of sick pay. There is no EU regulation regarding paternity
leave. In most countries this is, at most, just a few days after birth. Council Directive 96/34/EC of June 3, 1996, sets a minimum period of 3 months of parental leave. Both
parents have a 3 months entitlement, but one parent cannot transfer the right to parental leave to the other. Payment is legislated at country level. Directive 97/75/EC extends
the scope of Directive 96/34/EC to the United Kingdom. For the United States, maternity leave is regulated within the Family and Medical Leave Act (1993). It allows eligible
employees (tenure 1 1 year) of a covered employer (number of employees 1 50) to take unpaid leave (or to substitute paid leave if the employee has earned or accrued it)
because of birth/care of a child as well as for health conditions of the employee or family member. In Denmark, payments are based on unemployment benefits. In the United
Kingdom, only employees with tenure of more than 26 weeks are eligible for maternity pay. Employees with more than 1 year of employment with the same employer have
the right of “additional” maternity leave. In France, parental leave is paid only for workers having two or more children. In Germany, parental leave is paid until the child is
2 years old and for workers below a certain household income.
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Fig. 4.—Prejudice and the gender gap in unemployment rates
Table 13
The Impact of Attitudes on the Gender Gap in Unemployment Rates
(1) (2) (3)
Preference for male employment 11.91 5.71 5.76
(2.56) (1.99) (1.99)
Preference for male employment #
(male unemployment rate  9.6) 1.29
(.27)
Male unemployment rate .16
(.12)
Constant .43 2.47 4.18
(.92) (.69) (1.12)
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes
Number of observations 139 139 139
Note.—The dependent variable is the gap between female and the male unemployment rate. Each
observation is a region in a country in 1996. The variable “preference for male employment” is the
fraction agreeing with the statement “when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than
women”; this comes from a 1996 Eurobarometer survey.
time jobs in some countries, this results primarily in lower female labor
force participation and not in higher unemployment rates.
VIII. Conclusions
In many of the European countries with high unemployment rates, the
female unemployment rate is substantially above the male. This important
gender gap has hardly been studied: remedying that deficiency is the
purpose of this article. We show that, in the countries with a large gender
gap in unemployment rates, there tends to be a large gender gap in both
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Table 14
Part-Time Employment
Country
Female Male
Unemployed
Wanting
Part-Time Work
(%)
Employed
Working
Part-Time
(%)
Unemployed
Wanting
Part-Time Work
(%)
Employed
Working
Part-Time
(%)
Spain 7.8 16.5 1.3 2.6
Greece 6.8 5.7 0 2.6
Italy 34.4 12.4 3.7 2.8
France 23.2 30 2.7 5.3
Belgium 20.1 34 2.1 3.2
Netherlands 72.4 68.7 15.3 16.7
Luxembourg 36.1 18.1 0 1.3
Germany 23.7 33.6 3.2 3.3
Denmark 16.3 35.1 0 11.4
Portugal 0 8.3 0 1.6
Finland 7.1 15.2 0 6.5
Sweden 19.4 42.6 2.9 8.3
Austria 44.8 28.7 3.8 3
Ireland 47.2 22.2 0 5.7
United Kingdom 55.1 44.2 5.2 7.5
Source.—Eurostat Labour Force Survey (Eurostat, Luxemburg, 1996).
flows from employment into unemployment and from unemployment
into employment. It does not seem necessary to study the flows involving
inactivity to understand the gender gap in unemployment rates.
There is a tendency for the gender gap in unemployment rates to be
smaller in countries with higher levels of female labor market attachment,
to be larger within countries for demographic groups where we would
expect the largest gender differences in labor market experience, and to
fall over time in countries with rapid growth in female labor market
attachment. This points to the importance of human capital differences
as an important explanation of the gender gap in unemployment rates.
But this is not perhaps the whole story. Gender gaps in unemployment
rates have risen in the past 20 years in many European countries even as
the attachment of women to the labor market has risen. It is likely that
labor market institutions can explain part of the difference. Institutions
that compress wages (like minimum wages or trade unions) or act to the
disadvantage of groups with lower levels of labor market attachment (like
firing costs and the widespread use of temporary contracts) may magnify
the impact of human capital differences on unemployment rates. As the
overall level of unemployment is high in many European countries, em-
ployers may have long queues of workers for jobs, and this acts to the
disadvantage of women, as it makes it easier to indulge in any residual
prejudice against women.
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